PROCEDURAL DEFECTS AND ADMISSIBILITY OF WITNESS STATEMENTS ON OATH: A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN KATAGUM v UMAR

Abstract

This article critically examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Katagum v. Umar, which held that a witness’s subsequent oath and adoption of a written statement in open court were sufficient to preserve the validity of a witness statement on oath, notwithstanding the witness’s admission during cross-examination that the statement had been signed in counsel’s office. The article argues that the Court’s reasoning accords insufficient weight to the statutory requirements governing the administration of oaths and the execution of witness statements on oath.

It contends that a document described as a statement “on oath” is not rendered valid merely by the presence of a jurat or by its subsequent adoption in court. Rather, it must be executed before an authorized and impartial officer, with the place and date of execution accurately recorded. An unequivocal admission that the statement was signed in the office of the party’s legal practitioner ordinarily contradicts the jurat and raises legitimate concerns that counsel, counsel’s partner, or clerk may have improperly procured or authenticated the oath.

The article analyzes the relevant provisions of the Oaths Act, the Evidence Act 2011, and the Notaries Public Act 2023, arguing that these statutes distinguish between curable procedural irregularities and defects that undermine the authority, independence, and authenticity of the oath-taking process. While acknowledging that a fresh witness statement may be validly sworn and filed with the leave of the court, the article maintains that subsequent adoption in court cannot retrospectively validate an invalid pre-trial witness statement on oath. It concludes that the contrary approach weakens procedural integrity, encourages non-compliance with statutory requirements, and diminishes the safeguards intended to preserve the credibility and reliability of sworn evidence.